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A long view of liberal peace and its crisis 
David Rampton (LSE, Univ. of London) & Suthaharan Nadarajah (SOAS, Univ. of London) 
 
Abstract 
The ‘crisis’ of liberal peace has generated considerable debate in International Relations. However, 
analysis is inhibited by a shared set of spatial, cultural and temporal assumptions that rest on and 
reproduce a problematic separation between self-evident ‘liberal’ and ‘non-liberal’ worlds, and 
locates the crisis in presentist terms of the latter’s resistance to the former’s expansion. By contrast, 
this article argues that efforts to advance liberal rule have always been interwoven with processes of 
alternative order-making, and in this way are actively integral, not external, to the generation of the 
subjectivities, contestations, violence and rival social orders that are then apprehended as self-
evident obstacles and threats to liberal peace and as characteristic of its periphery. Making visible 
these intimate relations of co-constitution elided by representations of liberal peace and its crisis 
requires a long view and an analytical frame that encompasses both liberalism and its others in the 
world. The argument is developed using a Foucauldian governmentality framework and illustrated 
with reference to Sri Lanka. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The ‘crisis’ of liberal peace is the subject of considerable debate in International Relations 
amid the doubts that have overtaken post-Cold War confidence that a pacific world order 
based on liberal democracy, market economics and the rule of law could be generated by 
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West-led engagement in the world’s conflict spaces and institutional innovation in global 
governance. Scholars are divided over the viability and future form of liberal order, the 
sources and extent of its crisis and the efficacy of liberal peacebuilding as a modality of 
interventionist global order-making. Nonetheless, there is a shared and taken-for-granted 
understanding of where the frontier and limits of liberal peace are located: in the disorderly 
global South characterised by authoritarianism, civil war, identity conflict, 
underdevelopment, rights abuses and ‘ungoverned’ spaces. Relatedly, the crisis of liberal 
peace, in its various treatments, is understood as non-liberal and illiberal resistance to the 
assisted or imposed emergence of liberal rule. 
 
As such, despite their many disagreements, proponents and critics of liberal peace share a 
common spatial and temporal framing that rests on, and reproduces, a problematic 
separation between ‘liberal’ and ‘non-liberal’ worlds. First, the international system is 
implicitly or explicitly divided into two distinct parts: a stable liberal core of market 
democratic states, and a volatile non-liberal/illiberal periphery comprising both ‘rising’ 
powers and weak, authoritarian or partially liberalised states. This divide is fundamental to, 
for example, studies of democratic peace and the global ‘diffusion’ of liberalism, democracy 
and capitalism. Second, international engagements for liberal peace in the periphery are 
treated in presentist fashion as ‘first encounters’ between liberalism and its non-liberal 
others. Contemporary peacebuilding, developmental, democratisation and other 
interventions are routinely studied as interactions between pre-formed and distinct 
‘international’ (liberal) and ‘domestic’ or ‘local’ (non-liberal) actors, practices and contexts 
(cf. e.g. Williams, 2013), and often as characteristic of a distinct post-Cold War context1. 
This is not because scholars do not recognise colonialism, Cold War interventions, military 
and otherwise, and the historic consolidation of global capitalism have had a profoundly 
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transformative impact in the South, or the commonalities between current and earlier 
international attempts at liberal transformation and modernization (e.g. Jahn, 2007a, 2007b; 
Duffield, 2001). Rather, as this article shows, the ontological and epistemological premises 
of liberal peace as a universalising rationality of pacific order and of its critical treatments as 
a project of US/western hegemony, capitalist imperialism or ‘global governmentality’ 
preclude taking seriously the productive consequences of the long history of mutually 
constitutive relations between ‘liberal’ and ‘non-liberal’ worlds (e.g. Barkawi and Laffey, 
2001; Jahn, 2013). In great part, the above divisions rest on a more fundamental assumed 
distinction, that between liberalism and other social orders, such as nationalisms.2 However, 
as postcolonial scholars have emphasised (e.g. Goswami, 2004; Scott, 1999), failure to take 
the long view and an analytical frame encompassing liberalism and its others distorts our 
understanding of both and the intimate relations between them throughout what G John 
Ikenberry (2009) teleologically terms ‘two centuries of liberal ascendency’. 
 
This article argues that the obstacles and threats that a globally expansive liberal order 
apprehends in its periphery as representative of its limits, and now its crisis, cannot be 
understood without reference to the productive consequences over the longue durée of 
attempts to advance liberal rule in non-liberal spaces. Liberal interventions since the 
nineteenth century may not have always resulted in liberal rule, but they have been 
nonetheless deeply consequential, enabling, strengthening, disrupting and otherwise 
transforming processes of alternate order production. That is, liberal order-making has been 
and is implicated in the constitution of the very subjectivities, practices, contestations and 
violence that subsequently appear as major, and also self-evidently ‘external’, problems for 
liberal peace. More precisely, efforts to reorganise the nexus of population, territory and rule 
in ways required for liberal peace, turning on liberal conceptions of individual, citizen, 
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society, economy and state, have been always deeply interwoven with efforts towards 
alternate configurations representing different conceptions of order, security and peace. In 
their dynamic interaction, the pursuits of liberal peace and competing social orders, both 
‘local’ (e.g. nationalisms) and ‘global’ (e.g. Islamism), together generate the very identities, 
social relations, actors, power distributions, contexts, etc. that then appear as obstacles to, 
and also starting points for, expanding liberal peace. 
 
What we are pointing to is not simply the established criticisms that liberal interventions 
have been easily co-opted by local actors, or, conversely, that liberal states have cynically 
exploited and strengthened illiberal actors and practices for geopolitical or other self-
interested reasons, or that periods of democratic ‘transition’ or economic liberalisation 
exacerbate inequalities and hierarchies and thus potential for conflict and war; these are only 
surface problems. Moreover, by a long view are we not referring to, for example, how 
globalising neoliberalism results in state weakening and ‘new wars’, or inequality and 
exploitation and thus popular unrest, particularist mobilisations and conflict; our concern is 
with deeper constitutive relations between liberal and non-liberal worlds. We are also not 
restating the long-standing recognition that liberalism, nationalisms, and other social 
formations are always ‘hybrid’; this only gets us so far. Rather our argument, in the context 
of the perceived ‘crisis of liberal peace’, is that the pursuits of liberal and rival social orders, 
whilst informed by competing political rationalities and ontologies, nonetheless advance ‘in 
the world’ through shared political technologies, strategies and practices (such as 
securitised-development, democratisation, devolution, etc.), and in this interweaving 
together generate over the long durée the sometimes perverse outcomes that appear as self-
evident, and self-evidently external, problems for liberal peace. We develop our argument 
using a Foucauldian governmentality framework, a historically-informed approach and a 
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focus on liberalism and majoritarian nationalism, two social formations routinely treated as 
self-evidently distinct and antithetical. Our case study is Sri Lanka, a site of liberal 
transformative efforts over two centuries and, from the late colonial period, ethno-nationalist 
contestation, violence and high-intensity war, to all of which, as we show, the former has 
been always integral. 
 
The article proceeds through five sections. We first briefly review the recent literature on the 
crisis of liberal peace, highlighting the above noted spatial and temporal assumptions in 
apprehending the location of liberal order and its crisis. We next elaborate our analytical 
approach, making clear what we mean by governmentality-as-order and by liberal peace as a 
political rationality. In the third and fourth sections we explore our case study, Sri Lanka, 
and show how liberal and Sinhala-Buddhist nationalist order-making efforts there have been 
deeply interwoven since the nineteenth century. In particular, focussing on a key modality of 
order-making, securitised-development, we show how its manifestations in Sri Lanka 
through joint international and local practices came to generate a problem in common for 
both projects in the form of a resistant Tamil nationalism, and resulted not in liberal peace 
but the antithesis of liberal rule: militarized demographic change, nationalist mobilisations 
and a high-intensity ‘war for peace’ waged under global-local management. The conclusion 
considers the implications of the argument for analysis of liberal peace and its crisis. 
 
Locating liberal peace and its crisis 
 
After the Cold War liberal peace became the explicit ideational basis for western foreign 
policy and diverse yet converging transformative programs around the world by UN 
agencies, multilateral donors and an array of non-state actors (e.g. Duffield, 2001; Jahn, 
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2007b, 2013; Quinn and Cox, 2007; Paris, 1997; Zaum, 2012). However, these efforts have 
resulted typically not in stable liberal states and polities but fragile or illiberal ones (e.g. 
Jahn, 2013; Mac Ginty, 2011; Paris, 2010; Richmond, 2011). Amid persistent 
developmental failure, potent identity-based mobilisations, ‘illiberal democracies’, rise of 
transnational Islamic insurgency, etc., and liberal states’ violence in Iraq and Afghanistan 
and illiberal practices in the ‘War on Terror’, global liberal ambitions are also seen to be 
confronted by the ‘rise’ of non-western powers such as China and India, ‘decline’ in 
US/western power and authority, gridlock in international institutions and unevenness in 
global capitalism. Accordingly, a ‘crisis’ of liberal peace is apprehended both at the level of 
the international system and liberal peacebuilding, the project of expanding the West-
centred market-democratic ‘zone of peace’. 
 
At the systemic level, for many scholars the problem stems from the rise of non-western 
powers in an incomplete liberal-capitalist world order. For some, this is a ‘crisis of success’ 
as not only has this US-built order enabled the economic success underpinning new powers’ 
rise, they are seeking not to overturn it, but greater say in its management (Ikenberry, 2009: 
84; Stephen, 2014). However, liberal order is conceived here as an ‘open and rule-based 
order’ that has ‘evolved and periodically reinvented’ itself and as encompassing the West-
centred zone of democratic peace but less liberal than this core. Also emphasising evolution, 
other scholars drawing on the ‘practice turn’ in IR conceptualise liberal order(s) as a 
changing set of social practices (e.g. Adler, 2013; Koivisto and Dunne, 2010); these are the 
contingent outcomes of constant negotiation between ‘multiple modernities’, producing 
‘self-organising modes of regulation and reproduction in liberal world politics’ and 
comprising a ‘balance’ of ‘liberal and non-liberal practices’ (Koivisto and Dunne, 2010: 
640). However, for Charles A Kupchan (2014), such readings neglect the normative 
7 
foundations of hegemony, as non-western powers will seek alternative, possibly regional, 
orders ‘based on their own cultural, ideological and socio-economic trajectories’. 
 
Other analyses focus on liberal expansionism. For Michael Mann, the crisis represents the 
failure of US imperial ambitions in an era where the ‘balance of power has shifted in crucial 
military and ideological respects away from the Great Powers and the North toward poorer 
social movements in the South,’ (2004: 631). Conversely, for Georg Sørensen (2011) the 
problem is liberal states’ vacillation between extremes of ‘imposition’ and ‘restraint’ in 
advancing liberal values against the ‘reactions’ these provoke. ‘The ‘global 
governmentality’ literature (e.g. Dillon and Reid, 2009; Duffield, 2007; Neuman and 
Sending, 2010) treats liberal order as a governmental and biopolitical formation centred in 
the West and seeking to expand by transforming non-liberal life into liberal life, or, if it 
proves too recalcitrant, containing or exterminating it. The crisis emerges with the stubborn 
resilience of non-liberal life and the liberal hyper-violence this calls forth. If for Mann the 
lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan are how ‘the wretched of the earth have made the New 
American Empire still-born,’ but not weakened the imperialists’ resolve (2004: 653), for 
Michael Dillon and Julian Reid (2009: 43), such pre-emptive/preventive wars are integral to 
securing global liberal life, even as they ‘excite, intensify and extend’ the dangers to it. 
 
All these accounts rest on a self-evident separation between liberal and non-liberal worlds, 
implicitly or explicitly aligned with spatial and cultural difference. In a world of multiple 
modernities, a liberal (western) one jostles with non-liberal others represented by emergent 
non-western poles. State-society formations in the non-West, distinct from those in the 
West, are generating modes of capitalism which are ‘transnationally integrated, but 
substantially less liberal than that of the Western core’ (Stephen, 2014: 925). For Mann, ‘the 
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notion of outsiders marching in to install democracy is absurd, unless the natives want this 
and have experience of it’ (2004: 652; Sorensen, 2011: 82-87). In the global 
governmentality literature liberal order’s outside is collectively constituted by life, largely in 
the South, variously resistant to liberal rule, but otherwise lacking a specificity beyond this. 
 
Similar dichotomies inform liberal peacebuilding scholarship (cf. Sabaratnam, 2013).3 The 
mainstream literature locates the crisis in post-conflict spaces, wherein non-liberal agents, 
practices and conditions that sustain civil war, ethnic conflict, state weakness/failure, etc. 
also undermine international efforts to reproduce the conditions of self-sustaining peace in 
the liberal core in contexts of cultural plurality and absence of strong and legitimate state 
institutions, in contrast with historically stable governance and national coherence in the 
West (e.g. Barnett, 2006; Paris, 1997, 2010). Conversely, a diverse critical literature locates 
the crisis in the coercive/violent and market fundamentalist logics of international peace- 
and state-building more concerned with expanding global capitalism and security of the 
West than the needs and preferences of post-conflict societies (e.g. Cooper et al, 2011; 
Duffield, 2001). However, Roland Paris (2010) argues the authors of these ‘hyper-
criticisms’ propose no solutions that do not, at base, return to liberal principles (for a 
response, see Cooper et al, 2011). Oisín Tansey (2014) argues the critics fail to distinguish 
which negative consequences are attributable to international operations and which to local 
actors, concluding ‘it is often clear that international influence is overshadowed by the 
primacy of domestic politics.’ 
 
Other analyses seek to transcend what Michael Barnett et al (2014) label the ‘blame the 
victim’ and ‘blame peacebuilding’ divide through focus on the dynamic relations between 
international operations and post-conflict spaces. Barnett et al (2014) use game-theoretic 
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models to explore peacebuilding as a ‘strategic interaction’ between ‘international and 
domestic actors’ that results in a continuum of ‘compromised peacebuilding’. Similarly, the 
‘post-liberal’ or ‘hybrid’ peace literature (e.g. Mac Ginty, 2011; Richmond, 2011) locates 
the crisis in the resistance generated by the coercive and technocratic imposition of ‘one size 
fits all’ western state- and market-centred frameworks on ‘local’ cultures and contexts for 
which these are alien and illegitimate; the outcomes are neither liberal nor non-liberal, but 
hybrids of both. In these approaches also liberal (international) and non-liberal (local) 
worlds are analytically separated prior to meeting within liberal peace interventions 
(Nadarajah and Rampton, 2015; Sabaratnam, 2013: 266-8). 
 
In sum, what is precluded in scholarly engagement with the crisis of liberal peace is taking 
seriously the productive consequences, in both North and South, of the long history of 
attempts to advance liberal rule in non-liberal spaces. In great part, this derives from how 
liberalism itself is treated; whether in mainstream analyses, which take liberalism as a 
(heterogeneous) set of ideological values and normative principles, or in post-positivist 
accounts emphasising, variously, ‘practices’, governmental order, the multiplicity of 
modernity etc., liberalism as a social formation is accorded a solidity that enables it to be 
self-evidently distinguished (on its own terms) from its others. By contrast, this article 
emphasises the interweaving and therefore the mutual constitution of liberal and non-liberal 
social formations. We elaborate this below, first explaining our theoretical approach, which 
treats social formations as the fluid and contingent reifications of political rationalities, and 
thereafter showing through our study of Sri Lanka how two rival social formations, 
liberalism and majoritarian nationalism, have been co-produced over the longue durée 
through overlapping and interlaced practices and strategies undertaken in service of these 
competing ideals of order and peace. 
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Liberal peace as a governmental order 
 
Developing and pursued over centuries as a conception of human progress and peace, 
liberalism always has been a protean phenomenon, a shifting set of philosophical arguments 
and political-economic practices (e.g. Bell, 2014; Doyle, 1986; Gerstle, 1994). Significantly, 
liberal thought and practice have been mutually constitutive, developing together through 
colonial, Cold War and post-Cold War eras (e.g. Bell, 2014; Jahn, 2013; Mehta, 1999; 
Latham, 2000). In particular, as Duncan Bell shows, the specific conception of liberalism 
that has come to be taken-for-granted as the constitutive ideology of the West was produced 
in the mid-20th century by ‘a conjunction of the ideological wars fought against 
“totalitarianism” and assorted developments in the social sciences,’ mainly in the United 
States (2014: 685). Having also become the self-evident basis for a pacific world order, it 
remains the dominant policy framework for West-led efforts to this end (e.g. Cooper et al, 
2013: 3).  
 
The crisis of liberal peace, however, has prompted calls for eschewing dogmatic insistence 
on this singular ideal (e.g. Koivista and Dunne, 2010; Mac Ginty, 2011; Richmond, 2011), 
supported by references to liberalism’s historical heterogeneity and internal ‘tensions’ (e.g. 
Dunne and Flockhart, 2013; Ikenberry, 2009; Sorensen, 2011). However, for other scholars, 
such efforts to re/define liberalism are futile, as liberalism always has to be understood in 
ways that encompass its worldly diversity. For Bell (2014), liberalism ‘is best characterised 
as the sum of the arguments that have been classified as liberal, and recognised as such by 
other self-proclaimed liberals, over time and space.’ For Beate Jahn (2013) the 
‘contradictions’ within liberalism are more significant than simply evidencing its 
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heterogeneity or historical multiplicity; in her ‘immanent critique’, these are the 
‘fragmentary dynamics’ that ensue as liberalism encounters the gulf between theory and 
reality as it advances in the world. As such, rather than a resource for remaking liberal order, 
these contradictions are mutually constitutive of the recurrent - and inescapable - crisis of 
liberal peace as a project of global transformation. Her trenchant critique links liberal 
ideologies and (persistently abortive) western policy and practices but in so doing, her focus 
is on liberalism itself, as opposed to its dynamic relations with its non-liberal others in the 
world – something she recognises and leaves for future research to explore (2013: 12). 
 
However, in other analyses, the liberal - non-liberal encounter is key to understanding 
liberalism as a social formation. For Kimberly Hutchings (2013; see also, Hindess, 2004; 
Mehta, 1999), the separation between liberal and non-liberal is itself constitutive of 
liberalism and embedded in its quotidian practices; first, as a universalising and 
transformative project, liberalism ‘operates on the fundamental premise that some subjects 
are closer to being liberal than others’, with human progress being entirely reliant on the 
agency of liberal subjects, and, second, it is the very capacity to distinguish between the 
liberal and the non-liberal that defines liberals; liberals ‘are line drawing subjects par 
excellence’ (Hutchings, 2013: 162; Walzer, 1984). Inherent to this line-drawing however, is 
a denial of how liberal order ‘everywhere contains or is articulated with elements not well-
captured through its own concepts and categories’, which enables complex social 
formations, including whole world orders, to be described as liberal while simultaneously 
practices (such as racism and colonial/imperial violence) that are integral to re/producing 
these are asserted to be not liberal (Laffey and Nadarajah, 2012: 407). 
 
Drawing on such studies that seek to go beyond liberalism as a (heterogeneous) philosophy, 
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theory or doctrine, and foregrounding the contingent calculations, categorisations, 
hierarchies, etc. inherent to its worldly practices, this article treats liberalism as a political 
rationality i.e. as an ideal or vision of how human practices everywhere must be organised 
and regulated if order (peace) is to be secured (Dean, 2010; Larner, 2000; Rose, 1999). 
Following Laffey and Nadarajah, we understand liberalism as ‘a specific form of 
governmental reason and practice produced at the intersection of the European and non-
European worlds, [and] encompassing within its project both “liberal” and “non-liberal” 
spaces, practices and subjects’(2012: 417). Central to our analysis is the assumption that the 
re/production of social order rests not on the universalisation of ideological beliefs and 
values per se, but that of appropriate forms of conduct (Foucault, 2007). As Barry Hindess 
notes, ‘most if not all of the governmental devices that might be seen as falling under the 
(…) liberal mode of government could be and were supported by those who had no 
particular commitment to liberalism as a doctrine’ (1993: 310). As such, the emphasis is on 
how an ideal of social order rests on and advances through the inculcation of specific (e.g. 
‘liberal’) ways of behaving and calculating, i.e. the production and perfecting of desirable 
subjectivities and the reform or destruction of undesirable ones. To this end, our analysis 
draws on a Foucauldian governmentality framework (Foucault, 2007; Dean, 2010; Rose, 
1999), which we specify next. 
 
Governmentality and order 
 
Michel Foucault (2007) termed governmentality the circulating form of power at work when 
the regularised conduct of its subjects reifies an ideal of social order, the nexus of 
population, territory and political rule inherent to a given political rationality. For example, 
liberalism conceives of the individual as a rational, interest-motivated economic ego, and, as 
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Hutchings (2013: 160) puts it, central to any position calling itself liberal is the valorisation 
of individual freedom. Freedom, however, is exercised within and in relation to an ideal of 
society, and society as a device of liberal rule is coincident with the nation; nation refers to 
the population of the territorial state (Dean, 2010: 146-153; Canovan, 1996). In this way, as 
Margaret Canovan shows, even as they emphasise the primacy of the individual, liberal 
theorists nonetheless presuppose a political community ‘that has in practice been most 
closely approximated by certain nation-states’ (1996: 37). This inescapable contradiction has 
generated efforts to incorporate nationalism in political theorising by categorising its diverse 
manifestations in dichotomous and Manichean terms – e.g. civic/ethnic, political/cultural, 
Western/Eastern, etc. - aligned implicitly or explicitly with liberal/illiberal. However, as 
repeated critiques (e.g., Brubaker, 2004; Spencer and Wollman, 1998; Shulman, 2002) have 
shown, such dichotomies are untenable. Yet these are taken-for-granted in liberal peace 
theorising and praxis, manifesting in the routine categorisations of social orders, actors and 
practices as self-evidently either ‘liberal’ or ‘nationalist’. Consequently, not only is liberal 
peace equated with the individual (citizen) being able to attain her full potential through her 
maximised liberty, but in programmatic terms this has come to be seen as only possible 
within the framework of a market democratic state, pluralist polity and cosmopolitan 
society, all resting on a civic nation. 
 
First, however, if these subjects and devices of rule are not in place, they must be produced. 
This is less a matter of setting up institutions (e.g. Paris, 2004), than inculcating a specific 
rationality into quotidian conduct, and in this way enacting ‘realities’ such as society, nation 
and markets which constitute both the objects (vehicles) and ends of governmentality (e.g. 
Hindess, 1993; Hutchings, 2013; Rose, 1999). However, a political rationality, in and of 
itself, does not prescribe exact policies or practices; rather, it defines ‘the problem-space’ of 
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producing order in ways that make the governing of conduct intelligible, calculable and 
‘practicable’ (Rose, 1999 and Dean, 2010, passim). Consequently, liberal ends, for example, 
invoke diverse practices and policy responses to perceived problems that are both contingent 
on the calculations of liberal agents and at times contradictory (e.g. supporting or opposing 
self-determination, the use of force, etc.). 
 
Second, any governmentality, liberal or otherwise, works through the freedom of its subjects 
by inciting them to take up appropriate forms of conduct and eschew inappropriate ones 
(Dean, 2010: 43-46; Rose, 1999: 40-47). Stable order derives from well-behaved subjects, it 
is the aggregate effect reproduced in and by the self-regulated conduct of individuals, 
groups, organisations, etc., irrespective of the specific motivations (e.g. ‘self-interests’) 
inherent to their calculations (Foucault, 2007: 72-3; Scott, 1999: 38-51). Consequently, it 
matters less whether the rationality in question is recognised and accepted, than that the 
routine practices of its subjects are in accordance with its ends (Foucault, 2008: 44-45; 
Hindess, 2004; Rose, 1999:47-51). As such, governmentality does not make redundant 
sovereign power or disciplinary power; rather it seeks to subordinate these to its utopian 
ends and operates alongside them in a ‘triangle’ to re/produce appropriate forms of conduct 
(Dean, 2010: 29-30; Foucault, 2007: 106-8). Coercion and the use of force are integral to 
any governmental order, including liberal ones (e.g. Kienscherf, 2014; Rose, 1999: 24).  
 
Relatedly, it is the ideal of a good society that leads to the discovery within it of problematic 
sub-groups, and necessitates their subjugation and subjectification through sovereign and 
disciplinary powers such that if/once normalised, they can be integrated into it. Society, a 
‘unitary, living plurality’ (Foucault, 2003: 254-8), has to be ceaselessly defended against 
extant and potential threats. For example, the (global) living plurality secured by liberal 
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market democracy is continually threatened by ‘ethno-nationalists’, ‘religious 
fundamentalists’, ‘terrorists’, ‘rogue states’, monopolists, mercantilists, etc. Thus, with some 
subjects closer to being liberal than others, the key concern for securing liberal order is 
‘what can be governed through the promotion of liberty and what must be governed in other 
ways’ (Hindess, 2004: 30), or as Markus Kienscherf puts it, ‘liberal social control is best 
understood as uneven processes of pacification targeting specific individuals, groups and 
populations through a combination of coercion and consent’ (2014: 1). 
 
Third, and key to our argument, liberalism is always only one of multiple circulating ideals 
of rule (Walters, 2012: 68-74). The focus on liberalism (and western contexts) in 
governmentality studies has produced a relative eclipse of other political rationalities, such 
as nationalism.4 Yet nationalism continues to produce, in the West and elsewhere, potent 
alternate orderings of the nexus of population, state and territory that both confront and yet 
are always already shaped by engagements with colonial and postcolonial liberal order (e.g. 
Goswami, 2004; Scott, 1999). In their workings competing political rationalities come into 
conflict but also alignment; they confront but also colonise each other’s practices, strategies 
and assemblages, working on the same targets of rule – individual, society, economy, etc. – 
and sometimes through the same technologies of governance (Hindess, 2004: 28-31; 
Nadarajah, 2010). The significance for our analysis is not simply that liberalism and 
nationalism, for example, are hybrid social formations, but that the liberal/non-liberal line-
drawing inherent to analyses and praxis of liberal peace elides the integral role of liberal 
agents and practices in the production of rival social orders, and of the latter in the 
constitution of liberal order, and thus the joint re/production of the subjectivities, dynamics 
and consequences that then appear as self-evident problems for liberalism’s advance. We 
illustrate this in the next two sections with reference to Sri Lanka, but here we first outline 
16 
some ‘practicable’/programmatic implications of liberal peace as a political rationality. 
 
Liberal peace as political rationality 
 
While any ideal of rule entails the differentiated government of its diverse subjects, the telos 
of liberal rule, as a global conception of peace (Foucault, 2008: 56-58; Hindess, 2004: 24), is 
the unitary and majoritarian territorial state of one people, one citizen and one nation (e.g. 
Canovan, 1996; Kymlicka, 2005). Liberal peace requires the members of its living plurality 
to engage in relations that are unprejudiced by their membership of any particular 
subgrouping. Individual (human) rights have primacy, with ‘communal rights’ enacted 
ideally not by legal or constitutional codification of particularist identities, but the absence 
of individual unfreedom. While particularist identities may be unavoidable in the realm of 
societal interaction, their political implications should be minimised, through the sovereign 
power of law and disciplinary spread of pluralist conduct. As such, any political demand 
based on the identity of a group smaller than the ‘civic’ nation is, by definition, exclusive 
and thus dangerous, and it is the persistent primacy of such particularisms that makes them 
stand out as problems for liberal rule (e.g. Baumeister, 2000). To this end, while sovereign 
power is required to foreclose the possibility of violence, democracy and market exchange 
become key governmental technologies for enabling the individual progress that would 
undermine particularist mobilisations, and thus for ‘managing conflict’ in ‘divided 
societies’, while ‘civil society’ provides the circumscribed arena for particularist politics 
(e.g. OECD, 2001: 20, 56, 121-2). 
 
With liberal peace thus ‘irrevocably linked to the territorially sovereign state as an umbrella 
for political community’ (Richmond, 2007: 13), politics deriving from the notion of 
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‘homelands’ is deeply problematic. Inherently exclusivist, such claims threaten the 
‘fragmentation’ of society and state along ‘mono-ethnic’ lines.5 Thus even where forms of 
multiculturalism or constitutional recognition have been advanced as response to insistent 
particularist demands, the cosmopolitan imperative is to detach such recognitions of identity 
from territorial claims and impose the civic framework of ‘inclusive’ citizenship on 
‘minorities’ (e.g. Hale, 2002). Similarly, while frameworks of devolution, federalism, etc. 
are key conflict resolution tools, where compelled to be deployed along identity lines these 
represent tactical, but nonetheless risky, compromises towards the eventual universalising of 
liberal conduct that would yet secure the civic nation and market democratic state. As Will 
Kymlicka notes, ‘historically, most liberals in the West have endorsed the idea of equal and 
undifferentiated citizenship within a unitary nation-state, and have viewed ideas of 
multination federalism as a regressive compromise with premodern ethnic allegiances’ 
(2005:41; emphasis added). In Sri Lanka, for example, although federalism was forcefully 
promoted by via the Norwegian-led peace process (2001-2006), this was explicitly not as 
recognition of a Tamil ‘homeland’ and associated demand for ‘national self-determination’, 
but as decentralisation of state power to ‘all’ (to-be-determined) ‘regions’. Moreover, as we 
discuss below, the explicit ambition of this intervention for liberal peace, as others before 
and since, was a pacific order ‘acceptable to all Sri Lankans’ and within a ‘united Sri 
Lanka’. 
 
Sri Lanka I: liberalism, nationalism and crisis. 
 
Sri Lanka, our case study, is an enduring paradox on the frontier of liberal peace. On the one 
hand, since independence in 1948 the country has been an exemplar of the antitheses of 
liberal rule: majoritarian exclusion, ethnic antagonism, communal violence, widespread 
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rights abuses, protracted armed conflict and mass displacement. On the other hand, in all 
that time, except briefly after the war’s end in 2009, western states, international financial 
institutions, UN agencies and international liberal actors more broadly have enthusiastically 
engaged with the country as a space of delayed but promising liberal peace. As such, Sri 
Lanka has long been simultaneously representative of two rival and, as we argue, co-
constituted social orders-in-formation, liberalism and majoritarian nationalism. 
 
In this section and the next we show how the pursuits of these competing ideals of social 
order have advanced together since the nineteenth century through interwoven and shared 
governmental strategies, practices and technologies working on the same targets of rule 
(individual, society, economy, etc.). Significant for our analysis ‘is how the territorial 
nation-state serves as the unit of analysis and object of intervention for both international 
and state action’ (Herring, 2001:153). To restate our overall argument, in Sri Lanka as in 
other places, liberal engagements penetrate the warp and weft of social life as they seek its 
transformation, and in so doing they encounter rival rationalities of social order, and 
together these generate interlaced and complex, if fluid and contingent, assemblages of 
international and local actors, practices and strategies; in this way liberal engagements are 
integral to the re/production of the very social orders and violent contestations later 
apprehended as obstacles and resistances to liberal peace. In Sri Lanka this has emerged in 
the form of a Tamil ‘national’ identity and attendant demands for political 
autonomy/independence of the ‘homeland’ in the island’s Northeast. 
 
This section provides an overview of post-independence Sri Lanka and discusses the 
colonial–era emergences of liberal and Sinhala-Buddhist nationalist order-making. The next 
section shows how these aligned before and during three decades of war in a key modality 
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of order-making, securitised development. 
 
Sri Lanka – an overview of crisis 
 
Sri Lanka’s crisis emerged with independence as British-installed parliamentary democracy 
enabled the swift ascent to state power of populist nationalism and initiated the country’s 
reconstruction as a Sinhala-Buddhist ethnocracy (e.g. Bose, 1994; De Votta, 2004; Kapferer, 
2012; Krishna, 1999; Rampton, 2010; Tambiah, 1992). The colonising of state and social 
dynamics by a totalising majoritarian logic reached a watershed with the 1972 constitution 
which codified Sinhala-Buddhist primacy into law and removed already weak safeguards for 
minorities. While Buddhism had become a de facto official religion (Horowitz, 2014: 43), 
the new constitution made it the duty of the state to ‘protect and foster’ Buddhism, now 
accorded ‘the foremost place’ in the Republic. This articulation between Sinhala-Buddhism, 
national identity and territorial statehood only made visible the depth of nationalist social 
order well advanced through state policy and practices in spheres of development, security, 
administration, education and language (Rampton, 2010). For example, since 1962 
recruitment to the armed forces, and to a large extent the police, has been exclusively 
Sinhala (Horowitz, 2014: 74; Blodgett, 2004: 54) and the military’s ethos transformed into 
the defence of Buddhist order (Bartholmeusz, 2002; Kent, 2015). 
 
Resistance to this territorialised nationalist order-making in turn came to be organised 
around preserving the Tamil ‘nation’ and its ‘homeland’ against violent state-led 
assimilatory efforts (Bose, 1994; Rasaratnam, 2016). Mobilisation through mass protest and 
civil disobedience moved from demands for federal autonomy to independent statehood. In 
the 1977 elections a union of all major Tamil parties swept the Northeast on a manifesto of 
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‘national self-determination’ and secession. Stasis in the country’s crisis and militarisation 
of state-led Sinhala-Buddhist order-making produced in 1983 the island’s worst anti-Tamil 
pogrom and outbreak of armed conflict between Tamil insurgents and the Sinhala-
dominated armed forces. Despite two international peace-making interventions, by India in 
the 1980s and the West, led by Norway, in the 2000s, the conflict intensified inexorably 
until its cataclysmic end in 2009 with the destruction of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil 
Eelam (LTTE) amid the deaths of tens of thousands of Tamil civilians (e.g. United Nations, 
2011). 
 
Yet, throughout these turbulent decades, Sri Lanka has been treated as an integral, if 
imperfect, part of liberal order. In the fifties and sixties, despite the ascendance of 
majoritarian order, ‘punctuated by bouts of annihilatory violence’ against Tamils (Krishna, 
1999: 63), Ceylon retained excellent relations with the West, the Bretton Woods institutions 
and the Commonwealth (e.g. Farmer, 1957; Horowtiz, 2014), and was hailed as an exemplar 
of ‘third world’ democratization and social development (e.g. Moore, 1990: 347). Even as 
the ethnopolitical crisis became undeniable with the 1977 elections, assistance from western 
donors, the World Bank and IMF began to flood in (Herring, 2001: 144-5, 148) in great part 
as the new government decisively shifted its Cold War alignment towards the US and 
embarked on aggressive economic liberalisation, since continued by later governments 
(Lunstead, 2007: 12; Moore, 1990: 354; Shastri, 2004). Over the next three decades of 
armed conflict, rights abuses and mass displacement, Sri Lanka remained ‘historically one 
of the highest per capita recipients of international aid’, mainly from the World Bank, Asian 
Development Bank and Japan, but also major western donors (Goodhand, 2001: 10; Moore, 
1990: 356; Ofstad, 2002). Annual USAID funding averaged US$40m from 1956 to 2006 
(Lunstead, 2007: 12). 
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The outbreak of war prompted strong support from the United States and Britain for the 
defeat of the secessionist Tamil militancy, read as another communist threat to a member of 
the ‘Free World’ (Bose, 1994: 136n; Krishna, 1999: 120, 157; Miller, 2015). In the mid-
1990s West-led engagement, now explicitly aimed at liberal peace, expanded significantly 
through assistance for counter-insurgency, development, economic and institutional reform, 
peace-building, etc. The emergence of battlefield stalemate and economic crisis in 2001 
produced what a key donor-funded study described as a ‘more robust and multi-faceted 
international response to conflict and peace dynamics than has historically been the case’ 
(Goodhand et al, 2005: 10). Alongside Norwegian-led negotiations between the government 
and the LTTE, this entailed, on the one hand, a massive aid package to support revival and 
further liberalising of the economy and a raft of peace-building activities (Goodhand et al, 
2005), and, on the other hand, extensive western assistance - advanced weaponry and aerial 
surveillance equipment, training and advice - for strengthening the military (Blodgett, 2004; 
Lunstead, 2007: 17-18; Smith, 2011). With the collapse of the peace process in 2006 the 
government’s renewed offensive drew unwavering backing from western states until the 
LTTE was destroyed in 2009. Only as the triumphant government overtly repudiated liberal 
peace in favor of consolidating Sinhala-Buddhist nationalist order did liberal states move, 
albeit gradually and unevenly, towards a more disciplinary approach. 
 
While heterogeneous factors, including geopolitical, strategic, commercial and other 
considerations, informed liberal international support for and interventions in Sri Lanka, 
what is significant for our analysis is how ideals of social order, here liberal peace, carry 
ontological and epistemological assumptions that define the ‘problem space’ within which 
emerge policy choices and practices amid multiple motivations (see below). 
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Competing ideals of order: liberalism and Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism 
 
Efforts to produce liberal order in Sri Lanka began during British colonial rule, with the 
uniting in 1833 of three hitherto separate and ethnically-based administrative units (two 
Sinhala and one Tamil) into an all-island entity, and the concomitant constitution of a single 
‘multi-ethnic’ community as the basis for and vehicle of liberal rule. Today’s taken-for-
granted concepts of ‘Sri Lanka’ (the state) and the ‘Sri Lankan people’ (the ‘nation’) 
emerged as discursive products of explicitly liberal ambitions: the radical reforms of 1833 
were based on an archetypal utilitarian blueprint, the Colebrooke-Cameron Commission’s 
report (Scott, 1999; Wickramasinghe, 2006). Rejecting ethnic territoriality in favour of 
uniform and unitary administration, the reforms also introduced ‘local’ representation in the 
Legislative Council and civil service, and sought to dismantle mercantilism and state 
monopolies in the economy (Scott, 1999: 40-52; Wickramasinghe, 2006: 28-41; Rogers, 
1987). 
 
This colonial era experiment in liberal peacebuilding was not of course representative of 
British imperial rule, but on its own terms appeared largely successful. Inter-ethnic violence 
was minimal and important aspects of cohesion emerged with the rise of social groups with 
a stake in the new order, including a multi-ethnic English-speaking elite that helped run the 
state and economy (Horowitz, 2014: 38; Rogers, 1987: 588). In contrast to neighbouring 
India, for example, there was minimal anti-colonial violence, except for a brief and localised 
uprising in 1848, so much so there was no standing army, only a volunteer force, from 1873, 
when the Ceylon Rifle Regiment was disbanded, till 1949. As Donald L. Horowitz puts it, in 
colonial eyes Ceylon ‘had become an established, productive and isolated island colony’ 
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(2014: 59). Yet, this was to neglect the emergence and ascendance of a rival ideal of social 
order, that we term Sinhala-Buddhism.  
 
With considerable patronage from rising Sinhala middle classes, opposition to British rule 
was initiated in the late nineteenth century by Sinhalese Buddhist monks, lay activists and 
intellectuals, supported by international actors such as the Buddhist Theosophical Movement 
(e.g. Tambiah, 1992). The proximate target was liberal-secularism; resistance emerged as 
reaction to the perceived degeneration of (Sinhala) Buddhist religion and culture attributed 
to the de facto secular state’s toleration of Christian education and proselytising (Tambiah, 
1992: 5-6; Jayawardena 2004: 32-62; Rogers, 1987: 588-91). Commencing as protests 
against Christianity, anti-colonial resistance soon diffused to other areas of public life. This 
included education, as the Theosophical Movement established hundreds of Buddhist 
schools as alternatives to state and missionary education (Tambiah 1992), and worker 
struggles as extensive connections developed between Sinhala Buddhist revivalists and 
labour unions targeting British and colonial industries (Jayawardena 2004; Rogers, 1987). 
The temperance movement sought to mobilise the masses against the evils of alcohol, 
associated with polluting effects of colonialism (Rogers, 1987: 592). As such, the emergence 
of Sinhala-Buddhism as a rationality of order through diverse economic, political, cultural 
and social activities and a multiplicity of interests was not simply an elite phenomenon but 
encompassed the masses attending temperance meetings, strikes and anti-colonial protests. 
 
Through these diverse critiques of the liberal rule emerged a potent mobilisation within 
modern frameworks of nation, state, popular sovereignty and self-rule. Key to this was 
restoring the putative link, held to have been lost with imperial conquest, between sovereign 
power and Buddhism, wherein the latter legitimated the former and the former served to 
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protect and foster the latter (DeVotta, 2004: 27-28; Krishna, 1999). This articulation of 
colonial rule and liberal-secularism with an existential threat to Buddhism and Sinhala 
culture was legitimated by a set of historic chronicles authored by Buddhist monks setting 
out a narrative in which the Sinhala and their island motherland had been subjugated by 
South Indian and European invaders (e.g. Kapferer 2012: 34-41). In this way, a racialized 
opposition was discursively produced between the true ‘sons of the soil’, the Sinhala, on the 
one hand, and, on the other, the deracinated, decadent and westernised elites close to the 
colonial state, as well as the Tamils, Muslims and others deemed at one point or another 
responsible for the subjugation of the Sinhalese and the degeneration of Buddhist order (e.g. 
Gombrich and Obeyesekere, 1988: 213). As such, this rationality of resistance/liberation, 
which powerfully shaped state- and nation-building after independence, turned on a specific 
ideal of order wherein, alongside the cardinal link between state and Buddhism, is a 
territorialised (all-island) social hierarchy with Sinhala Buddhists at the top and others, 
conceived in its logic (as in liberalism’s, see below) as ‘minorities’, lower down. 
 
Confined to legal and peaceful spaces, this growing agitation was not deemed a serious 
threat to colonial rule or liberal ambitions (although the 1915 anti-Muslim pogrom prompted 
a crackdown), and in 1931 colonial rule enacted another liberal technology, universal 
suffrage - just two years after its introduction in Britain (by contrast Indians received 
universal suffrage only after independence). The explicit goal was to inculcate an inclusive 
civil-secular ‘national’ politics that would overcome the problems of both elitism and what 
was termed ‘communal politics’ (Scott, 1999: 164-165). Rejected by the British drafters of 
the new constitution were non-Sinhala demands for codified checks against majoritarian 
domination (DeVotta, 2004: 35-37). The coeval effect of unified administration and 
universal suffrage under a ‘national’ framework was to articulate a ‘Ceylonese’ (now ‘Sri 
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Lankan’) identity and political community resting on a territorialised logic in which Sinhala-
Buddhists were conceptualised as a ‘majority’ and others as ‘minorities’ (Scott, 1999: 172-
176; Rogers, 1987: 594-6). While the full potential of this politics of number was not 
mobilised until after independence (DeVotta 2004; Krishna, 1999: 67-8), liberal 
technologies of rule both prompted the emergence of Sinhala-Buddhism and enabled its 
ascent into, and later colonisation of, mainstream politics and state policy. 
 
In treating Sinhala-Buddhism as a political rationality (cf. Larner, 2000), what is important 
is not whether its ideological principles or the historical claims on which they rest are 
consciously accepted, but how this ideal of order is given effect through the diverse 
conducts of its varied subjects. In other words, it is less important that Sinhalese, Tamils, 
and others within and beyond the island subscribe to its racialized hierarchical tenets than 
that their routine practices reify its ideal of order. We discuss this next with reference to a 
central strategy of modern order-making, securitised-development. In particular, we show 
how separate ambitions for liberal cosmopolitan and Sinhala-Buddhist nationalist orders 
came to be pursued through the same projects of demographic reorganisation (development 
as security) and counter-insurgency (security as development), aiming to produce across the 
island territory an ideal of ‘one country, one nation, one people and one citizen’ albeit to 
different governmental registers of peace. 
 
Sri Lanka II: Securitised development and ‘war for peace’. 
 
The link between development and security has a long genealogy, having been forged in 
Europe and colonial and postcolonial societies through the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries as a way of managing class and identity-based disorders linked to landlessness, 
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urbanisation and proletarianisation consequent to capitalist development and colonial rule 
(e.g. Buur et al, 2007; Duffield, 2005). Each manifestation of this link, however, rests on 
one or other ideal of the ‘right’ nexus of identity, land, population and political community 
equated with stability and peace. As such, securitised-development is a governmental 
technology for containing and destroying extant or potential threats to social order and 
inculcating the diverse conducts and capacities necessary for its reproduction. 
 
The section illustrates with reference to Sri Lanka a key dynamic in our argument: the 
coming together of different governmental ambitions in the same strategic projects of 
territorialized order (peace) making. We first discuss this alignment in relation to 
development, in particular how large-scale donor and state partnered programs of 
resettlement, land allocation and irrigation engineering were undertaken as responses to 
perceived disorder, actual and potential. We then discuss how it manifested in joint 
international and state efforts to contain and destroy the Tamil secessionist insurgency. Our 
emphasis is less on the motivations of individual participants (states, donor and UN 
agencies, corporations, NGOs, etc.) within these evolving assemblages, than on how ideals 
of stability and peace (here liberal peace, on one hand, and Sinhala-Buddhism, on the other) 
provide the ‘problem spaces’ for diverse calculations that produce their interlacing practices, 
with perverse outcomes. 
 
Development, security and order 
 
Development as a security measure has a long history in the island. In the 1930s the colonial 
state saw resettlement of the poor and landless as a response to potential threats to social 
order (Farmer, 1957: 116-60; Moore, 1985: 34; Peebles, 1990). It thus initiated ‘internal’ 
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colonisation, whereby peasants were moved from densely populated areas to vacant Crown 
lands alongside irrigational development. But these ‘experiments’ in resettlement, mainly of 
Sinhalese (from the South) to Tamil-majority areas (in the Northeast), also incorporated a 
utilitarian ambition to foster ‘individual, independent, peasant proprietorship’ (Farmer, 
1957: 103-108, 120-123). However, after independence, this state-led program not only 
expanded (see scale in Pfaffenberger, 1990: 366-7), it became reconstituted in state 
discourse, rituals and practices as the ‘reclaiming’ of lands where ancient Sinhala kingdoms 
had ruled before foreign conquest (Moore, 1985: 45; Herring, 2001: 150-2, 165). In the vast 
majority of developmental projects into the eighties, there was an explicit prioritisation of 
settling large numbers of Sinhala cultivators in areas where Tamil-speakers were the clear 
demographic majority (Herring, 2001: 149, 151; Manogaran, 1994; Pfaffenberger, 1990: 
390-1). 
 
The first point here is how Sinhala-Buddhist order-making through state-led demographic 
reorganisation itself generated a territorialised and equally modern rationality of Tamil 
resistance, articulated as a nation imperiled in its (northeastern) homeland. Whereas Tamil 
demands in the run up to independence had centred on constitutional safeguards against 
majoritarianism (i.e. power-sharing at the unitary centre), resistance now mobilised around 
preserving the demographic integrity of what was now termed the ‘Tamil homeland’ (Bose, 
1994; Krishna, 1999; Rasaratnam, 2016). It began in the fifties as unsuccessful demands for 
territorial autonomy in the form of federalism. Notably, however, Tamil leaders rejected 
secession. But with the passing of the 1972 Sinhala-Buddhist constitution, Tamil resistance 
cohered on ‘national self-determination’ through independent statehood.  
 
The second point is the integral role of international donors in these dynamics. Although the 
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first colonisation projects after independence were almost entirely state-funded through 
internal loans, even these, such as the landmark Gal Oya scheme with its huge dam built by 
a US firm, drew considerable foreign technical assistance, especially from Australia, New 
Zealand and the US (Farmer, 1957: 330-31; Uphoff 1992: 28). As state-led colonisation 
expanded through the fifties and sixties, these projects were increasingly funded by the 
World Bank and Commonwealth countries (Farmer, 1957: 330-332). Conceptualizing their 
engagement as supporting ‘national development’, donors initially adopted a supposedly 
neutral approach of infrastructural development and what were termed ‘basic human needs’ 
and ‘integrated rural development’. However, even as Sri Lanka became an enthusiastic 
testing ground for structural adjustment in the late seventies, the massive aid inflows that 
rewarded neoliberal reform (see above) were often directed towards large infrastructure 
development within state-led colonisation projects. Emblematic of this is the massive and 
entirely donor-funded Accelerated Mahaweli Development Programme (AMDP), named 
after the island’s longest river, which alone drew almost half of Sri Lanka’s foreign aid 
between 1979 and 1984 (Herring, 2001: 149). This was by design, rather than co-option: not 
only was the AMDP only possible due to foreign aid, the scheme’s layout was itself drawn 
up in 1968 by the UNDP, based on an original plan by a US-Sri Lankan expert team 
(Herring, 2001: 149-151). The World Bank led the way, Britain, Germany, Canada and 
Sweden funded major dam building projects, and whilst USAID concentrated on Gal Oya, 
half its aid went to AMDP (Herring, 2001: 150; Levy, 1989: 453-57; Lundstead, 2007: 12; 
Uphoff, 1992: 30). 
 
Donors envisaged schemes like the AMDP and Gal Oya as actually serving to contribute to 
peace by virtue of their ‘multi-ethnic’ character and developmental promise – for example, 
USAID’s major criterion in selecting Gal Oya was to help ‘the poorest of the poor’ (OECD, 
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2001: 34; Uphoff 1992: 31). Two logics effaced ethnic differentiation from donors’ 
‘problem space’. At the macrolevel, the nation-state was the unit of analysis – ‘the nation 
had needs[:] rice, self-sufficiency, electric power, [and] a higher GDP’ (Herring, 2001: 153, 
inserts added). At the microlevel, donors sought to foster in farmer beneficiaries pacific 
capacities such as self-management, self-sufficiency, entrepreneurship and cooperation, and 
equity in individual self-improvement (Uphoff, 1992). USAID assistance in Gal Oya, for 
example, was held to have ‘contributed – or better said, elicited and reinforced – positive 
relations between the Sinhalese and Tamil communities (…) where the project was located,’ 
(Uphoff, 1992: 113, emphasis added).  
 
This was despite the schemes’ Sinhala-Buddhist thrust being obviated by, first, the state’s 
official rhetoric which included slogans such as ‘return to the land of the kings’, ‘monks and 
peasants of the Mahaweli’, and other references to ‘the glories of ancient Buddhist Sinhalese 
civilisation’ underlined by, for example, the building of twice as many Buddhist temples 
(216) as schools (Hennayake, 2006:108; Herring, 2001: 150-2, 165; Pfaffenberger, 1990: 
391), and, second, the AMDP encompassing older colonisation schemes alongside new ones 
advanced through forcible eviction of Tamils and settlement of armed Sinhala colonists, 
now with the explicit added logic of broaching areas Tamils were claiming as part of their 
homeland (Manogaran, 1994: 114-5).6 Donors’ occasional recognition later of the AMDP’s 
consequences for ethnic relations – and the now raging armed conflict - ‘did not stop the aid 
business from continuing as usual’ (Herring, 2001: 152; Levy, 1989). 
 
In sum, colonisation and irrigation schemes served as a shared governmental technology for 
two competing projects of peace-through-development, with different conceptions of order 
and the sources of disorder. Consequently, at the advent of armed conflict, donors’ pursuit of 
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liberal rule through state-partnered securitized-development had been integral to the advance 
of majoritarian nationalist order-making, and the very processes of ethnic polarisation, 
dispossession, displacement and militarization through which were constituted a Tamil 
‘national’ identity, popular mobilization, and secessionist aspirations for the homeland. The 
outbreak of war, meanwhile, intensified western engagement in Sri Lanka, discussed next. 
 
Global-local war for peace 
 
Following the anti-Tamil pogrom in July 1983, a simmering but small Tamil militancy 
exploded into a fully-fledged armed struggle (e.g. Bose, 1994: 93-94). Over the next three 
decades, this ‘war for national liberation’ posed the foremost obstacle to Sinhala-Buddhist 
order-making, including temporarily arresting colonisation. Significantly, simultaneously, it 
became securitised within global liberal frameworks. While non-violent secessionist 
agitation had already increased British-Sri Lankan security cooperation from 1979 (Miller, 
2015), with the onset of war Tamil insurgency was read as the primary threat to advancing 
liberal rule in Sri Lanka. In the eighties it became integrated into the US-led war against 
global communist insurgency, with assistance delivered through military contractors and 
western allies – Israel, South Africa and Pakistan (Bose, 1994: 136n; Krishna, 1999: 120, 
157; Miller, 2015). After the Cold War it was confronted as another of the violent identity-
based extremisms and disorders preventing expansion of a now triumphant liberal peace. As 
such defeating the Tamil armed struggle (‘terrorism’) and the secessionist project of Tamil 
Eelam (‘extremism’) became a shared priority for both liberal peace and Sinhala-Buddhist 
nationalist order-making. 
 
From the 1990s this alignment generated an integrated and intensifying global-local effort at 
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pacification incorporating the Sri Lankan armed forces and other state arms, donors, western 
security establishments, UN agencies and an expanding network of humanitarian agencies, 
human rights and peace-building NGOs. While donor aid was increasingly framed around 
‘peace’ and stabilizing the nation-state against fragmentary pressures (Goodhand et al, 2005: 
77-87; Ofstad, 2002), counterinsurgency/ terrorism drew increasing emphasis. Centred on 
enabling the conditions (i.e. an end to war and secessionist demands) for ‘inclusive’ 
peacebuilding, a political solution ‘acceptable to all Sri Lankans’ and liberal progress more 
generally, the West-led international community’s approach to the conflict was well 
captured by the state’s own slogan of ‘a war for peace’ (Bartholomeusz, 2002: 34; Ofstad, 
2002: 168-9). 
 
As with the colonisation projects, this militarised pursuit of liberal peace, on the one hand, 
and Sinhala-Buddhist nationalist order on the other, manifested in a global-local security 
assemblage that waged, ultimately successfully, the war for peace. It brought together the 
militaries and intelligence agencies of Sri Lanka, the US and Britain amongst others, and 
later, with emphasis on curtailing Tamil diaspora support for the LTTE, also incorporated 
western police and domestic security agencies, charity watchdogs, the US Treasury, etc., 
assisted by western proscriptions of the LTTE (Laffey and Nadarajah, 2012; Lunstead, 
2007: 17-18; Miller, 2015). While China has long been Sri Lanka’s largest arms supplier, 
and this is routinely cited as undermining liberal international efforts, it was Western 
assistance that proved crucial. For example, having fully reorganized the military’s 
communication networks, and provided a key warship and advanced naval guns, the US 
supplied real-time satellite intelligence to locate and destroy the LTTE’s supply ships far in 
the Indian Ocean, ensuring in great part the government’s victory (Smith, 2011: 455). 
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With the LTTE and its armed struggle perceived as the primary obstacle to liberal peace, 
what was less significant for international engagement was the deeply Sinhala-Buddhist 
character of the armed forces. Not only is the 300,000-strong military overwhelmingly 
Sinhala, its institutional and ceremonial practices are steeped in Buddhist ideology 
(Bartholomeusz, 2002; Kent, 2015). Moreover, as Tessa Bartholomeusz shows in her study 
of Buddhist ‘just war’ ideology in Sri Lanka, the government not only ‘ask[ed] its warriors 
to consider their campaigns against terrorism as holy work,’ it equates securing peace with 
the ‘defence of Dharma’ (2002: 36). Whilst the international community was not blind to 
this, in the frameworks of liberal peace, they were assisting a modernizing market 
democracy’s forces against a violent, ethno-nationalist, secessionist challenge. Thus, the 
alignment was not simply the Sri Lankan state co-opting the West’s ‘War on Terror’ for its 
own ends; rather, the driving logic of international practices itself was how liberal progress 
in Sri Lanka required the containment or destruction of the LTTE and ‘its’ nationalist 
secessionist project. 
 
International expectations of and commitment to liberal peace in Sri Lanka remained 
steadfast even as the global-local counterinsurgency inflicted heavy civilian casualties, 
massive humanitarian deprivation and rights abuses and displaced over a million people, 
mainly Tamils, within the country and as refugees. The war ended in 2009 with the 
destruction of the LTTE amid the systematic killings of tens of thousands of Tamil civilians 
(e.g. United Nations, 2011). Yet even the mass atrocities did not dissuade liberal 
engagement. Instead, it was the victorious government’s explicit rejection of liberal peace in 
favour of consolidating Sinhala-Buddhist nationalist order that produced from 2012 a shift 
away from peace operations within Sri Lanka to disciplining the state towards post-conflict 
‘reconciliation’ and negotiated constitutional change via frameworks of UN-supervised 
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accountability for war crimes. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This article argued that attention to the long history of efforts to advance liberal rule reveals 
how these are inextricably implicated in the generation of the very problems and crises that 
are apprehended as characteristic of the non-liberal world and representative of the limits, 
and recently the ‘crisis’, of liberal peace. The analytical premise is that enactments of liberal 
ambitions may not always succeed and sometimes fail disastrously, but they nonetheless 
always produce. Processes of liberal order-making penetrate the warp and weft of social life 
in their transformative ambitions, and in so doing encounter rival rationalities of social 
order. Competing political rationalities come into conflict but also alignment, disrupting but 
also colonising each other’s practices, strategies and assemblages and working on the same 
targets of governance, albeit to different registers of the ‘right’ nexus of population, territory 
and rule representative of order and peace. In this way efforts to advance liberal rule are 
internal, not external, to the longue durée production of the subjectivities, practices, 
contestations and violence that are analytically delineated as self-evident obstacles and 
resistances to liberal peace and as endogenous to its periphery. 
 
While our case study was Sri Lanka, similar dynamics are visible elsewhere. In Afghanistan, 
efforts in the eighties to defend liberal order (against communism) invigorated the advance 
of social orders turning on Wahabism and Pathan nationalism, calling up fresh liberal 
interventions this century. In Iraq liberal peace confronts Kurdish nationalist and other 
order-making projects shaped by resisting and appropriating international practices over a 
century, including colonial boundary making, support for and later a decade of no-fly zones 
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to contain the violence of Saddam Hussein’s regime, and finally an attempt at liberal order-
making through occupation. Competing political rationalities thus shape geopolitical 
outcomes as much as ‘local’ ones, and while mainstream histories of liberal peace may not 
be written at the margins, they are certainly produced there. 
 
Making visible these dynamics of mutual constitution that result in what is apprehended as 
the crisis of liberal peace requires a long view and an analytical frame that encompasses 
both liberalism and its others. Yet the crisis, in its various treatments, continues to be read in 
presentist and dichotomous terms of non-liberal resistance to the assisted or imposed 
emergence of liberal peace. Foundational to this are a set of spatial, cultural and temporal 
assumptions, wherein liberal and non-liberal worlds are separated a priori and equated with, 
respectively, a West-centred zone of market democracy and the diverse and disorderly 
global South. Yet this is to distort the workings of liberalism ‘in the world’. For example, as 
David Williams shows, international development actors today are deeply embedded in 
developing state operations in ‘almost all areas of domestic economic policy, most political 
processes and institutions, many social and cultural practices’ (2013: 1214). Similar 
interlacing can be found in the evolving globe-spanning security assemblages defending 
liberal order through the ‘War on Terror’ (e.g. Bachman, 2014). As our analysis of Sri 
Lanka showed, the deep-seated and sometimes perverse outcomes of these global-local 
assemblages are not determined by the competencies or motivations of individual actors, but 
emerge over the longue durée through the interwoven pursuits of competing ideals of order. 
 
As a specific conception of global order, liberal peace rests on transforming states and 
societies the world over through the inculcation of specific (‘liberal’) capacities and 
conducts, i.e. the production of appropriate subjectivities and eradication of problematic 
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ones, through processes that are violent in both epistemic and material terms. To this end, 
liberalism colonises, even as it denounces and seeks to transform, the non-liberal and 
illiberal practices and assemblages it encounters in its expansion, including those of 
differently governmentalized states and societies (Dillon and Reid, 2009: 20). Conversely, 
however, other governmental rationalities, both local (e.g. nationalisms) and global (e.g. 
Islamism) advance by appropriating as well as resisting the practices and assemblages of 
liberal order-making. Consequently, the routine dichotomising of liberalism and, say, 
nationalism into separate compartments of the universal and the particular becomes 
untenable. Instead, the interweaving of the always already mutually constituted universal 
and particular means the one confronts and yet permeates the other, in both North and South. 
Moreover, ‘peace’, liberal or otherwise, does not mean one ideal of rule has permanently 
replaced others, but that the latter remain submerged and immanent to it. As such, any 
governmental order is inherently unstable, a disequilibrium whose maintenance relies on 
constant vigilance and violent and disciplinary intervention. Consequently, the recent 
emphasis on scaling back liberal ambitions in favour of, for example, accommodation 
between ‘multiple modernities’ or hybrid forms of peace encompassing liberal and non-
liberal practices as ways to overcome the crisis of liberal peace, misconstrues how 
governmental order, liberal or otherwise, embodies a totalising ambition in struggle with 
rival others. As such, the crisis of liberal peace should be understood as a specific 
interpretation of the present and past of liberalism in the world, the same line-drawing on 
which two centuries of efforts to advance liberal peace have been premised. Plus ça change, 
plus c'est la même chose. 
 
 
 
36 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
1 E.g., Chandler 2010: 22; Duffield 2007:1; Mac Ginty 2011: 5; Paris 2010: 337; Richmond 
2011: 1. 
2 Central to the analysis presented here is the co-constitution of liberal and other social 
formations. Thus references to liberalism and nationalism as ‘rival’ social orders denote this 
assumption in liberal peace scholarship and praxis. We discuss this below. 
3 A seam of (quasi-realist) criticism sees this entire intellectual enterprise as flawed, as it 
‘overstates the liberalism of contemporary peace interventions, and understates the enduring 
importance of strategy, states and geopolitics in the making of peace’ (Selby 2013: 58-59; 
Chandler, 2010; Zaum, 2012; for a response see Joshi et al, 2013). However, this is to posit a 
self-evident dichotomy between (objective) strategic interests and (cosmetic) ideological 
justifications. Geopolitics and strategic considerations are of course constitutive of foreign 
policy, but these do not stand apart from, but emerge through, ideologies, ‘world views’ or 
governmentalities. For example, tracing the direct links between the ‘liberal peace’ concept’s 
rise to dominance and the United States’ to global power, Quinn and Cox note ‘the United 
States seeks to create liberal societies as a means of securing its global role and its preferred 
form of ultimate international order’; ‘the ideological history of the United States has wedded 
it to a brand of internationalism that rests for its integrity, in American eyes, on the pursuit of 
liberal universalism’ (2007: 516; see also Latham, 2000; Jahn, 2007 a, 2007b). 
4 As William Walters (2012: 10, 68-74) points out, while in much of the literature 
governmentality has been erroneously treated as synonymous with liberalism, the rapidly 
expanding field includes studies of non-liberal rationalities and of non-Western contexts in 
both colonial and post-colonial eras. 
5 In this context, the liberal principle of self-determination given form in the dismantling of 
empire has since been recast in practice such that it applies to the state’s entire population, 
and not sub-groups (e.g. Etzioni, 1992; Archibugi, 2003). Where new states have emerged 
recently (e.g. Kosovo or South Sudan) this is less to do with the primacy of self-
determination than failure to advance liberal peace against the majoritarian resistance of the 
states and polities they were part of, and independence has been always preceded by 
extensive efforts to produce unity-for-peace in the whole, and followed by probationary 
periods of international management during which the tenets of liberal peace have to be 
adopted and internalised. 
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6 For a state manager’s detailed and explicitly nationalist account of state-led 
colonisation/development, in particular AMDP, as ‘permanent solution’ for ‘destroying the 
physical bases for Eelam’ see Gunaratna, 2009; for a donor expert’s liberal account of the 
same dynamics, see Uphoff, 1992. For a technical analysis of a century of internal 
colonisation, including donors’ role in the Mahaveli schemes, see Pfaffenberger, 1990. 
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